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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
• Vehicle ramming attacks are not a new tactic, but the volume and lethality of vehicle 
ramming attacks has increased over the long run, although based upon the first 
nine months, it appears that the number of attacks will significantly decline in 2019.
• MTI’s latest tally shows 184 vehicle ramming attacks since 1963; 128 (70% of the 
these) have occurred since January 1, 2014.
• Unlike other forms of terrorist attack, most of which occur in conflict zones in the 
developing world, most vehicle ramming attacks occur in developed countries—
Europe and the United States account for more than half of the recent attacks.
• Mentally unstable individuals—people who did not get the help and intervention 
they needed in time—account for 91 of the 184 attacks (49%) and also account for 
209 (43%) of the 481 fatalities, the largest share of any attacker group. Attackers 
motivated by Jihadist sentiments or ideology account for only 19 (10%) of the attacks 
and 144 (30%) of the fatalities.
• Not counting the drivers, vehicle rammings average 2.6 fatalities per attack.
• Vehicle ramming attacks are not the most lethal terrorist tactic, but for those who 
cannot get guns or bombs, vehicles are a readily available “weapon” and easily 
accessible targets are just around the corner.
• Terrorists did not invent the tactic of ramming vehicles into crowds of people. Like 
kidnappings and airline hijackings, they adopted into their repertoire a tactic that 
had already appeared in earlier incidents.
• None of the terrorist groups that appeared in the late 1960s and early 1970s utilized 
the tactic. They preferred bombs and guns—legitimate weapons of revolutions 
and war.
• Ramming attacks did not become a terrorist tactic until the 1990s when Palestinians 
started carrying out vehicular assaults in Israel, and did not become a major feature 
of the Palestinian terrorist campaign until a decade later.
• Both al Qaeda and ISIS have urged their followers abroad to carry out car ramming 
attacks beginning in 2010. The initial exhortations produced no discernible response.
• A cluster of attacks appears to follow the November 2016 issue of the online ISIS 
magazine Rumiyah, which urged car ramming attacks, but a spectacular attack in 
Nice, France, which killed 86 persons and preceded the exhortation in Rumiyah by 
four months, may have inspired both the author of the article and other attackers.
• More important, the data show a contagion effect that reaches beyond political 
extremism. It is not an ideology, exhortation, or lack of violent alternatives that unite 
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Executive Summary
the perpetrators of vehicle ramming attacks—it is the tactic. One event inspires 
another. Attacks occur in clusters.
• The data from 1981 to the end of September 2019 show a gradually growing volume
of attacks with a sharp increase after 2013 followed by a decline in 2019. Lethality
also increases very gradually, then declines, owing to the greater volume of low-
level incidents.
• A majority of the attacks (54%) occur in the more developed countries (minus Israel);
the developing world accounts for 23% of the attacks; 22% of the attacks take place
in Israel and the West Bank.
• However, the developing world accounts for 49% of the fatalities compared to 45%
in the developed world.
• As for individual countries, Israel and the Palestinian Territories lead with 41 attacks,
followed by the United States with 39 attacks, China with 28, France with 14, and
the United Kingdom with 10.
• In countries with more than 10 attacks, those in China have been the most lethal,
followed by France, United Kingdom, Israel and the Palestinian Territories, and the
United States. (This may be skewed by incomplete reporting of low-level incidents
in China.)
• Of the four major attacker categories, mentally unstable individuals account for 91
(49%) of the attacks and 43% of the fatalities; Palestinian attackers account for 22%
of the attacks but just 6% of the fatalities; jihadists account for 10% of the attacks
but 30% of the fatalities; finally, right-wing extremists account for 5% of the attacks
and 4% of the fatalities.
• Attacks by jihadists and mentally unstable attackers have seen the sharpest increase
in recent years.
• Confirmed and possible suicide attackers are the most lethal—they account for
17% of the attacks but 44% of the fatalities.
• Incidents with the highest number of fatalities per attack occur when attackers
are able to plow into public gatherings; people walking on partially pedestrianized
streets that allow some vehicle traffic come next, followed by people gathered at
bus stops or near train stations.
• Most attackers (71%) use their own or a family vehicle; in 9% of the cases, the
vehicle is stolen, and in 5% of the cases the vehicle is rented.
• Attacks involving rental vehicles, however, are the most lethal, accounting for
29% of the total fatalities. This reflects that fact that the attack is the result of prior
planning, not spontaneous, and that renters are able to acquire larger vehicles,
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
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which can be more lethal.
• Given that urban areas contain hundreds of thousands to millions of vehicles and
millions of pedestrians, prevention of vehicle ramming attacks is not a realistic
security goal.
• More realistic are mitigation measures that focus on improving the protection of the
most attractive and lucrative targets of vehicle ramming attacks—public gatherings,
street markets, and pedestrianized or partially-pedestrianized streets. This can be
achieved with both temporary and permanent barriers.
• Recommended security efforts also include increasing scrutiny of vehicle renters,
especially those renting large vans or trucks.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On April 3, 2019, police in Maryland arrested a man for plotting to drive a stolen rental van 
into crowds of people at National Harbor, a popular tourist site along the Potomac River. A 
convert to Islam, he claimed to have been inspired by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 
(ISIS). The defendant had stolen the rental van several days before in Virginia and initially 
contemplated driving into passengers at Dulles International Airport, but found the crowds 
there were too sparse for his purpose. He then changed the target to National Harbor, just 
under 10 miles from the Capitol in Washington, DC. The incident was one of was one of 
nearly 13 to occur in the first three quarters of 2019 across the world 
Vehicle ramming attacks or vehicular assaults, as they are sometimes called, continue to 
be a popular terrorist tactic, although the motivation of the attacker is not clear in all cases 
and some appear to be the result of unstable or disturbed minds. The Mineta Transportation 
Institute issued an earlier report on the tactic in May 2018.1 This report expands and 
updates that analysis and more than doubles the number of incidents included. We were 
also able to collect more information about the old and added events, allowing us to refine 
the research and state findings with greater confidence. 
There is no need to examine both reports. Where relevant, we point out where the new 
analysis has altered some of the observations made in the earlier report.
This report examines 184 car ramming attacks from a number of perspectives, including 
overall trends, lethality, geographic location, perpetrators, tactical innovations, and venues. 
That enables us to suggest some possible countermeasures as well evaluate some of the 
proposed countermeasures.
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II. WHY TERRORIST TACTICS HAVE EVOLVED TO MORE
PRIMITIVE TACTICS 
In terms of trajectory and total numbers, the popularity of this tactic resembles the rise 
of kidnappings of diplomats following the abduction by urban guerrillas in Brazil of the 
American ambassador in Rio fifty years ago in September 1969. By the beginning of the 
1980s, more than 150 diplomats had been the targets of terrorist kidnappings. Airline 
hijackings also saw a dramatic increase in the later 1960s and early 1970s before 
increased security measures, international agreements, and pressure on the terrorist 
groups reversed the trend.
Terrorist tactics have evolved incrementally over the past half-century. The basic terrorist 
repertoire—bombings, armed assaults, assassinations, hostage-taking—remains close to 
what it was in the early 1970s. Over time, heightened security measures have reduced 
the frequency of certain tactics and attacks on certain target sets: airline hijackings have 
become a rare event; terrorists no longer storm embassies; fewer diplomats are kidnapped.
Terrorists have always preferred soft targets where they do not have to plan to and then 
overcome security measures. Since unprotected targets are virtually unlimited, there is 
little pressure for terrorist innovation in tactics or weapons.
The terrorist arsenal has also remained stable for a half-century. Improvised explosives, 
assault rifles, and ordinary firearms are used in most attacks and account for most 
casualties. Recent knife and axe attacks and vehicular assaults reflect a trend toward more 
primitive weapons and tactics. This, in turn, reflects recent changes in terrorist strategies 
and recruiting.
Terrorists escalated their violence by orders of magnitude between the 1970s and 2001, 
the year of the 9/11 attacks—from tens to hundreds to thousands. Terrorist tactics rely on 
shock value to attract attention. Staying in the headlines requires escalating violence or by 
bringing it closer to ordinary living—pedestrians walking on streets or sitting at restaurants 
or pubs—in other words, by making it appear that no one anywhere is safe. 
The emergence of groups inspired by religion-based ideologies contributed to the 
escalation of violence. The substitution of God’s will for political constituency eroded self-
imposed constraints, such as killing large numbers of innocent civilians, including children. 
Religious fanatics count only on heavenly approval for their actions. Condemnation by those 
regarded as unbelievers or infidels matters little, and undiluted commitment guarantees 
paradise. Among religiously inspired terrorists, suicide attacks became common.
Extrapolating from the 9/11 attacks led authorities to worry about future events that 
could produce tens or hundreds of thousands of casualties. Attacks of this scale could 
be achieved only with weapons of mass destruction, which many presumed would be 
the next terrorist step. But obtaining such weapons would require centralized enterprises 
with considerable resources and capabilities and involve larger groups of people, which 
increases the chance of detection.
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Why Terrorist Tactics Have Evolved to More Primitive Tactics 
Terrorism has not followed the anticipated post-9/11 trajectory. Following the 9/11 attacks, 
al Qaeda was put under enormous pressure, and many of its leaders and key operatives 
were killed or captured; further, its communications and control were disrupted, degrading 
its operational capabilities. On the run or hiding out, al Qaeda’s central leadership was 
obliged to rely on the local initiative of its members to continue its global jihad. In this more-
hostile operating environment, carrying out strategic strikes on the scale of 9/11 or even 
larger seemed less likely.
Until about 2006, al Qaeda alumni and allies were still able to carry out terrorist operations 
that were one or two orders of magnitude less than the 9/11 attacks but still spectacular—
attacks in Tunisia, Indonesia, Kenya, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Egypt, Turkey, and 
Jordan, in addition to major attacks in Spain and the United Kingdom. These attacks 
persuaded the countries affected to more vigorously suppress the local groups that 
threatened them directly and to cooperate more closely with other nations facing similar 
threats. Gradually the level of violence subsided, although lower-level attacks continued.
However, the political turmoil that spread across North Africa and the Middle East in 
2011 presented the Jihadists with new opportunities, which al Qaeda was quick to 
exploit. Its comeback, however, was disrupted by a deadly internal schism that saw the 
emergence of a rival Jihadist enterprise in Syria and Iraq—the Islamic State of Iraq and 
(greater) Syria, or ISIS. ISIS took advantage of the tumult caused by the civil war in Syria 
and continuing antipathy between the Sunnis and Shias in Iraq to sweep across the 
two countries and establish the Islamic State, which attracted expressions of support 
and pledges of loyalty from groups across the region. 
In contrast to al Qaeda’s priority of attacking the “far enemy,” ISIS remained focused on 
the local struggle—building the Islamic State and defending its territory. But like al Qaeda, 
ISIS used the Internet and, even more effectively, social media to attract recruits and 
inspire action abroad. 
Instead of the vertical escalation anticipated immediately after 9/11, the Jihadists 
escalated laterally to remotely field a global army. Recruiting into the ranks of the 
post-9/11 Jihadists differed significantly from terrorist recruiting in the 1970s. The early 
cohorts of volunteers were vetted before being taken into tiny clandestine organizations, 
which had to survive underground in a hostile environment. The danger of infiltrators or 
of unreliable recruits posed operational and organizational risks. The groups 
remained small. In contrast, Jihadist recruiting relied on exhortation rather than 
traditional recruiting. 
Volunteer Jihadists were urged via the Internet and social media to act on their own 
initiative. If they could make it to an al Qaeda training camp or, later, to the Islamic State, 
they would be welcome. Tens of thousands flocked to the Islamic State. It is unlikely 
that all the arrivals were reliable, but this was not a serious problem where ISIS 
maintained absolute control—recruits could not easily betray the organization, and if 
judged unreliable, they could be dispatched to suicide missions.
Recruiting for operations abroad required no investment on the part of ISIS. Their online 
magazines and communicators on social media could reach a broad audience, providing 
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Why Terrorist Tactics Have Evolved to More Primitive Tactics 
potential recruits with inspiration and instructions. If they carried out an attack, their actions 
would bring applause and recognition—the remote conferral of membership and status as 
warriors. It was low-yield ore, producing a large but mostly virtual army and occasional 
low-level actions.
The change in recruiting methods produced changes in the local terrorist population and 
also affected tactics. The Internet attracted individuals—it did not create local groups. 
Terrorist campaigns were replaced by one-off attacks; there was no institutional learning, 
no improvement in operational skills over time. Instead, jihadists remained mostly 
unconnected individuals operating alone with limited resources. When they did reach out 
to join others, they risked being taken in by police undercover operations. Isolated jihadists 
could not sustain terrorist campaigns or inspire sufficient numbers to create a high volume 
of violence.
The use of vehicles as weapons is an ideal tactic for today’s circumstances. Vehicles are a 
readily available “weapon.” Limited skill is required, and the ability to drive is widespread. 
Little preparation is required for an attack. Cities filled with people and vehicles provide 
ample targets which cannot easily be protected, and high body counts are potentially 
achievable. It is not surprising, then, that the number of car-ramming attacks has increased.
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III. TERRORISTS DID NOT INVENT THE TACTIC
Terrorists did not invent the tactic of ramming vehicles into crowds of people. Like kidnappings 
and airline hijackings, they adopted into their repertoire a tactic that had already appeared in 
earlier incidents. The first incident in our database occurred in 1964 and involved an angry 
bus driver who drove his vehicle through the streets of Taipei, running down four people, 
three of whom died, before stabbing himself in an attempted suicide. In 1973, a mentally-
unstable 21-year-old woman living in Czechoslovakia decided to take revenge for the hatred 
she felt from society and her family. She rammed a truck into people waiting for a tram in 
Prague, killing 8 and injuring 12. She was later executed. Most of the early incidents were 
carried out by persons who can be described as mentally unstable—people who did not get 
the help and intervention they needed in time. 
None of the terrorist groups that appeared in the late 1960s and early 1970s utilized 
the tactic. They preferred bombs and guns--legitimate weapons of revolutions and war. 
Running down pedestrians at random would have tarnished their image and alienated 
supporters. Adopting vehicle ramming as a tactic was a response to operational needs, but 
it also required a change in mindset. More recent generations of terrorists escalated their 
violence, which almost always meant killing indiscriminately. Random murder—generally 
associated with mentally unstable perpetrators—is a more recent terrorist adoption. 
Ramming attacks did not become a terrorist tactic until the 1990s when Palestinians 
started carrying out vehicular assaults in Israel. Many of the attacks targeted off-duty 
soldiers waiting at bus stops—a ubiquitous sight in Israel—but some of the attacks were 
directed against both soldiers and groups of civilians. 
The adoption of the tactic by Palestinians was initially tentative. The drivers were not 
known to be members of any of the Palestinian terrorist groups and may have been acting 
on their own volition—no group publicly urged car ramming as a tactic. Vehicle ramming 
attacks were not a feature of the First Intifada, which began in 1987, ironically in reaction to 
an Israeli truck driver losing control of his vehicle and colliding head-on into an automobile 
near a large Palestinian refugee camp, killing four. Palestinians began rioting in response 
to what they saw as a deliberate attack. The violence associated with uprising subsided 
in 1991 and ended in 1993.
After one early incident in 1991, in which a Palestinian attempted to ram Israeli soldiers 
waiting at a hitch-hiking post, the next incident in Israel occurred years later in 1996 when 
a car crashed into passengers at a bus stop in Jerusalem, killing three and injuring 11.2 
The next vehicle ramming attack in Israel did not occur until 1999 when a Palestinian 
driver steered his car into a crowd at a bus stop, sped off, and returned minutes later and 
attempted to run over the victims of the first attack. Another attack occurred in 2001 when 
a Palestinian bus driver plowed his vehicle into a crowded bus stop, killing eight, including 
seven soldiers, and injuring 17 others. 
In this case, the driver’s motives remain unclear. He had passed Israeli security checks 
to obtain his permit to drive a bus in Israel, and was not known to be a militant or to have 
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suspicious connections. His family said he did not belong to any group. He had begun 
seeing a psychiatrist for severe depression and was taking medication. The incident 
occurred just months after the beginning of the Second Intifada, and family members 
indicated that he closely watched the events on television where he lived in Gaza. Whether 
he had been secretly recruited, decided on his own to act, or simply snapped is not known.
HAMAS claimed responsibility, but Yasir Arafat, the head of the Palestinian Authority, said 
the incident was an accident, not a deliberate attack, indicating that he did not want the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) to be associated with such an act. 
Car ramming did not become a major feature of the Palestinian terrorist campaign until a 
decade later. The 2001 bus attack was the only vehicle ramming attack to occur during the 
Palestinian uprising known as the Second Intifada from 2000 to 2005, during which there 
were hundreds of bombings, armed assaults, and rocket and mortar attacks. Occasional 
vehicle ramming attacks occurred during subsequent years, especially in the summer of 
2008, but the sharp increase in Palestinian vehicle attacks did not begin until after 2014. 
Still, HAMAS and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad were the only Palestinian groups to call for 
such attacks. By 2016, vehicle ramming attacks had evolved from a statistically rare event 
to reportedly become the second most common form of attack in Israel and the second 
deadliest form of attack carried out by Palestinians, behind only stabbing.3
The increasing difficulty of smuggling explosives into the West Bank after the 
construction of the West Bank Barrier built in response to the Second Intifada and 
increased border barriers and controls between Gaza and Egypt is offered as at least a 
partial explanation for the subsequent increase in car rammings by Palestinians. Car 
rammings increased as preferred modes of attack became more difficult. Palestinians 
may also have found inspiration in exhortations from global Jihadist groups like al 
Qaeda and ISIS.
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Both al Qaeda and ISIS have urged their followers abroad to carry out terrorist attacks, 
specifically car ramming attacks. In a 2010 issue, Inspire, the online magazine created 
by al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), suggested using a vehicle as a “mowing 
machine,” not to mow the grass, but to mow down the enemies of Allah in a vehicle 
ramming attack.4 
The article provided some practical advice on choosing a vehicle (a pick-up truck 
preferably with four-wheel drive), choosing an appropriate place (pedestrian-only 
locations are recommended), and it mentioned the need to gain speed and aim for the 
crowd. 
Yahya Ibrahim, Inspire’s chief editor and the author of the article, also instructed readers 
how they might modify the vehicle to make it a more effective killing machine by mounting 
steel blades to the grill, thereby ensuring that the truck would slice through its victims’ 
torsos rather than merely hitting them in their lower extremities. This added elaboration 
seems needless and increases risk since it requires extra material and logistics. None 
of the attackers made the modifications. 
However, the gory imagery served al Qaeda’s propaganda purposes, guaranteeing 
media attention and sending shivers down the spines of those in the West who would 
read about it in press accounts. The descriptive language is also typical of terrorist porn, 
intended to excite its readers with visions of cleaved corpses flying through the air. For 
many would-be jihadists, action means vicarious participation in vivid verbal and visual 
fantasies. 
ISIS has repeatedly called for vehicle ramming attacks. In 2014, its spokesman, Abu 
Mohammad al-Adnani, instructed followers abroad to attack American and French 
disbelievers and their allies using bombs and guns, and if these were not available, 
“smash his head with a rock, or slaughter him with a knife, or run him over with your car.” 
A French-language video also produced by ISIS in 2014 urged followers to “kill them and 
spit in their faces and run them over with your cars.”
In a 2016 issue of its online magazine, Rumiyah, ISIS outlined how followers outside 
the Middle East could kill the enemies of Islam. In grisly language similar to that used by 
al Qaeda, ISIS describes how the “Crusaders” will be reminded of the painful reality by 
“vehicles that unexpectedly mount their busy sidewalks, smashing into crowds, crushing 
bones, and severing limbs”.5 Carrying out a vehicle ramming is an appropriate way of 
“announcing one’s allegiance” to the organization. The Islamic State’s leader and its 
websites have repeated the call for ramming attacks. 
In his August 2018 message, ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi urged followers abroad 
to carry out attacks “that will tear out their hearts and make them lose their minds, for a 
piercing bullet, or a stab deep in the intestines, or the detonation of an explosive device 
in your lands is akin to a thousand operations here with us [in Iraq and Syria], and don’t 
neglect the ramming attacks on the roads.”6 
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On August 8, 2019, a communication from ISIS appeared on an encrypted messaging 
platform urging believers abroad to attack targets in the United States, Russia, and 
Europe. The image depicts a masked driver reflected in a rearview mirror. Looking ahead 
through the windshield, one can see a busy intersection with a yellow taxi, suggesting 
a vehicle attack in New York City. On the 18th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, Al Qaeda 
leader Ayman al-Zawahiri issued a video urging renewed commitment and action, using 
Israel as a motivating factor, but he did not focus on or highlight vehicle rammings as 
had been done previously.7
The initial exhortations by al Qaeda in 2010 and ISIS in 2014 produced little immediate 
response. In May 2015, an Emirati ran over a U.S. jogger in the United Arab Emirates. 
The jogger survived. The driver had previously traveled to Turkey in an unsuccessful 
attempt to join al Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria and was also reported to be plotting other 
terrorist attacks when he attempted to kill the American jogger. In January 2016, a 
French Jihadist drove his vehicle into French soldiers guarding a mosque in Valence, 
France, injuring two. 
On July 14, 2016, however, a Jihadist inspired by ISIS drove a truck into a crowd of 
people who had gathered on the Nice waterfront to watch the fireworks celebrating 
Bastille Day. He killed 86 persons and injured several hundred. This remains the 
deadliest vehicle ramming attack and a continuing source of inspiration. Our database 
identifies 15 more Jihadist-inspired vehicle-ramming attacks since the 2016 attack in 
Nice. 
It is difficult to discern any close correlation between the Jihadist publications 
and subsequent Jihadist attacks. In the MTI database, there is a 55-month gap 
between the 2010 article and the first vehicle assault we can clearly label as 
“Jihadist.” Further, the November 2016 call for vehicle ramming attacks in ISIS’ 
Rumiyah appeared months after the Bastille Day attack, suggesting that ISIS was 
just as much inspired by events as it was the source of the inspiration. Overall, we 
can merely say that there was an accumulation of exhortations and eventually an 
increase in attacks. 
Figure 1 illustrates the lack of a clear correlation between Jihadist attacks since 2010 
and 2019 and the exhortations we have described.
Figure 1. 2010 through Sept 2019: Jihadist Exhortations and Attacks 
The Jihadist “Mowing Machine”
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The initial exhortations produced no discernible response. A cluster of attacks appears to 
follow the November 2016 issue of Rumiyah, but the spectacular attack in Nice, France, 
which occurred in July, may have had an inspirational effect. Similarly, the May 2017 
video that ISIS posted on multiple Telegram channels, twitter accounts, and their 
Jihadist forum may have inspired the six Jihadist vehicle ramming attacks in France, the 
United Kingdom, and Spain that occurred in the following three months, but again the 
attacks themselves may have inspired imitation. 
Repeating the same messages over and over again, hoping to ultimately affect their 
audience’s behavior, is often a feature of advertising and political campaigns. Given the 
ability of al Qaeda and especially ISIS to reach a large audience via the Internet and social 
media; the ease, especially in the United States, of acquiring a vehicle; and the minimal 
planning necessary to use it in an assault, the small number of Jihadist vehicle 
ramming attacks suggests that the Jihadist campaign has produced only meager results. 
In the more than eight years since al Qaeda published its first article urging followers to 
carry out vehicle ramming attacks, there have been only two such vehicle ramming 
attacks in the United States that can be clearly labeled Jihadist. Jihadists in Europe 
have carried out 11 vehicle ramming attacks. In this sense, one can argue that thus far this 
Jihadist campaign is anything but a public relations success. The Jihadists’ exhortations 
targeting the 3 to 4 million Muslims residing in the United States have produced two clearly 
confirmed Jihadist vehicle rammings since 2006. As a marketing campaign, it would be 
judged so far to be a failure.
At the same time, two-thirds (18) of the 27 vehicle ramming cases in the United States since 
those exhortations have been carried out by mentally disturbed individuals who had 
no known connections with al Qaeda or ISIS. However, in the public’s mind, they are 
blended with the Jihadist attacks and add to the general level of fear. The Jihadist 
propaganda machine was therefore able to brand the tactic and benefit from its 
occurrence regardless of who was responsible.
Since the fall of the Islamic State, at least as far as controlling territory, ISIS propaganda 
activities have been greatly reduced. Although it remains active on the internet, for now, 
ISIS seems focused on continuing its insurgency in Syria and Iraq. Terrorist activities 
outside of countries where ISIS has established active fronts (Syria, Iraq, Libya, 
Afghanistan, and several countries in Africa) also declined in 2019. No vehicle-ramming 
attacks inspired by ISIS have occurred since November 2018.
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
14
V. A CONTAGION EFFECT THAT TRANSCENDS POLITICAL
EXTREMISM
Exhortation by terrorist organizations and operational necessity, by themselves, may not 
sufficiently explain the spike in vehicle ramming attacks. In a recent article in the British 
Journal of Criminology, Vincent Miller and Keith J. Hayward ask, “Why, given the mass 
availability of automobiles for many decades around the world, have these motorized crimes 
suddenly been adopted by everyone from committed Islamic State-affiliated jihadists to 
‘lone-wolf’ Palestinians and other Muslims with no previous links to organized terrorist 
groups, to anti-Muslim extremists, to American right-wing Christians, to unbalanced 
members of the public at large?”8
The authors argue that the release date of the online terrorist exhortations does not 
correspond to the pattern of attacks. They point out that more than four years passed 
between the publication in 2010 of “the ultimate rowing machine” article and the rise of 
vehicle ramming attacks in Western cities. (The authors suggest that the 2010 article may 
have been inspired by a 2006 vehicle ramming attack. The 2006 attack on the campus of 
the University of North Carolina in Chapel Hill, which injured 9 people, was carried out by 
an individual who professed anger about the treatment of Muslims around the world). All of 
the eleven vehicle ramming attacks in Europe and the United States between the article in 
Inspire and the first Jihadist attacks were carried out by individuals who can be 
described as mentally unstable.
Miller and Hayward are also critical of what they call the “security hypothesis,” pointing 
out that “preventative measures against terrorism have been in position for decades” and 
therefore cannot explain the recent shift to softer targets. This observation is not entirely 
true, and is therefore a weaker argument. Counter-terrorist measures around train stations 
and the public areas of airports have been increased, with additional police and military 
patrols, for example and bollards in cases, particularly in Israel. 
More important, security measures include not only target hardening, but efforts to make 
the acquisition of explosives for bombs—the traditionally-favored weapon of terrorists—
more difficult. Improved intelligence and broadened police powers have also made the 
formation of conspiracies more difficult, forcing groups like al Qaeda and ISIS to rely 
on remotely-inspired lone operators who have limited resources. We would suggest that 
changes in recruiting methods also contribute to the increased use of more accessible 
“weapons” and the adoption of more primitive tactics. 
Nonetheless, we agree with Miller and Hayward in their conclusion that the data also show 
a contagion effect that reaches beyond political extremism. It is not ideology, exhortation, 
or a lack of violent alternatives that unite the perpetrators of vehicle ramming attacks—it 
is the tactic itself. One event inspires another, creating a contagion effect propelled by 
modern communications technologies, particularly social media. 
For example, some of the attacks carried by mentally unstable individuals have been 
inspired by previous attacks, primarily through the internet. Alek Minassian, who rented a 
van and ran over and killed 10 and injured 15 on April 23, 2018 in Toronto, Canada, was 
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a member of the “Incel” (Involuntary Celibate) movement. After his arrest, he said he had 
been in contact with Eliot Rogers, also an “Incel”. 
According to reviews of the official 2015 police report released in 2015, on May 23, 2014, 
in Isla Visa, California, Rogers stabbed and killed two male roommates. He then bought a 
latte, sat in his black BMW coup, and calmly uploaded his final video called “Retribution,” 
promising a night of revenge against the females who had denied him the pleasures of a 
normal sexual life. At around 9:15 pm, he drove to the Alpha Phi sorority house and shot 
three women (two of whom were killed). He drove off and shot several people from his car 
and rammed into a number of others. He finally slammed into a parked car. Police arriving 
at the scene found that he had killed himself by a gunshot to the head. In just eight minutes 
he had killed 6 and injured 14. 9
Minassian said that he hoped his act would inspire others who were “too cowardly to act 
on their anger.” He warned, “I know of several other guys over the internet who feel the 
same way.”10 
The contagion effect described by Miller and Hayward goes beyond mere imitative behavior. 
It represents a more complex phenomenon in which diverse actors animated by a variety 
of individual circumstances and group causes observe and incorporate vehicle ramming 
attacks as a mode of acting out. The connectivity is not the motive, but the performance is.
Clearly, as we shall see below, the world has witnessed a dramatic increase in vehicle 
ramming attacks since 2014, and especially in the period 2017 and 2018. This does suggest 
the kind of diffusion of terrorist tactics that was seen in airline hijackings, kidnappings of 
diplomats, and takeovers of embassies in the 1970s. 
One might also look for a contagion effect in the distribution of these attacks during this 
recent period. Although many of the attacks occur with less than a month’s separation, and 
there are single days in which two attacks took place around the world, it is in the heavier 
volume of events in 2017 and 2018 that more clearly discernible clusters are found. For 
example, in 2017, of the 36 attacks, more than half took place in three clusters: 6 in only 13 
days, 6 in 25 days, and 5 in 20 days. More striking still, in 2018, 26 of the 35 attacks (nearly 
75%) took place in five clusters: 5 each in periods of 17, 19, 20 and 24 days, and 6 in 28 
days. The “clustering” of attacks since the surge began in 2014 can be seen in Figure 2A; 
the display of the fatalities caused, are more sporadic showing varying degree of attacker 
skill or “luck”, is displayed in Figure 2B.
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Figure 2A. All Attacks: 2014 through September 2019
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The ease of vehicle ramming allows spontaneity, which in turn may manifest itself in the 
observed contagion effect. However, Israeli officials who have examined such attacks 
in Israel would question the perception that vehicle ramming attacks reflect spur-of-the-
moment decisions. Tracking back through the Internet activity of the attackers suggests 
that the idea of a vehicle ramming attack entered their minds well before the attack 
itself. The attack itself may reflect a sudden impulse or opportunity, but does not reflect 
when the attacker started to think about it. This offers an opportunity for dissuasion or 
deflection. What we do not know is how many individuals may have thought about such 
scenarios before abandoning the idea.
This is the way terrorist tactics spread. A spectacular terrorist event will prompt many 
terrorist groups and individuals to contemplate whether such a tactic or target would work 
for them. Operational constraints (one individual recruited in an unsuccessful plot to carry 
out a vehicle ramming attack did not know how to drive), individuals assessing the risk 
as too high, or considerations of personal morality may cause many to discard the idea. 
The response to exhortations and tactical innovations is low yield. But if there are enough 
imitators, the innovation becomes a wave.
Similar to previous waves of airline hijackings and the current phenomenon of mass 
shootings, vehicle ramming attacks empower marginalized individuals, at least for a brief 
moment. The tactic may subside, as have other tactical fads, only to be replaced by some 
other form of accessible violence.
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Vehicle rammings occur almost every day. Most of these are not vehicular assaults by 
terrorists, but rather rammings by drivers overcome by road rage, persons in the middle of 
domestic quarrels who run over their partner in the driveway, and individuals attempting to 
escape police in pursuit. 
Our focus was on attacks directed against public targets, that is, those directed against 
pedestrians on public streets or adjacent public buildings, including tourist sites, hospitals, 
and restaurants; public gatherings, including street markets, spectator events, celebrations, 
and demonstrations; and surface transportation hubs, including bus stops and train or bus 
stations. We also included attacks against police or other security personnel guarding 
public places. We were especially interested in attacks by persons who expressed some 
kind of political motive, but we also included attacks by persons judged to be mentally 
disturbed, recognizing that the line between the two types of attackers is sometimes thin. 
We excluded attacks in war zones, where police or military personnel manning checkpoints 
are often targets. We excluded vehicular attacks in which the primary purpose was to 
deliver an explosive device. We also excluded ramming attacks on government buildings 
such as embassies or military bases. 
We also chose to exclude attacks against military forces in their barracks or while not 
actively protecting the public, or manning checkpoints—as they do frequently in the West 
Bank. We have also excluded attacks on military forces in the UK, France, and Canada, 
for example. However, we have included attacks against military personnel when they are 
at bus stops or train stations, or guarding any public target. These are judgment calls that 
we needed to make.11
Also excluded were accidents—which, by definition, are not attacks—as well as ramming 
attacks that targeted a particular individual, such as altercations between motorists. 
And finally, we excluded rammings connected with escaping criminals and car chases. 
Excluding anger in and of itself is not possible.
As with all databases, in many cases, the decision to include or exclude a specific incident 
unavoidably requires some judgment. Readers might disagree here or there, but we do 
not believe that occasional definitional differences are likely to have more than a marginal 
effect on the basic observations.
The database used in this analysis has been created by the authors and is not part of 
the terrorist databases held by either the Mineta Transportation Institute or the RAND 
Corporation. Using the Global Terrorism Database maintained by START at the University 
of Maryland, some material available from the RAND Corporation, and a few incidents 
contained in MTI’s own database, along with our own searches, we identified 184 vehicle 
ramming events to be analyzed. Although this more than doubled the number of incidents 
examined in the earlier MTI report, we cannot claim that this figure represents the universe 
of vehicle ramming attacks—incidents with no or few casualties that occurred years ago in 
areas with little media coverage may be lost in the mist of time. We did not include those 
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incidents where we could not ascertain whether the attack met our criteria. For example, 
the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported in September 2019 that there had been 765 
vehicle ramming attacks in the previous 48 months, resulting in 10 fatalities.12 During this 
same period, we have recorded 24 vehicle ramming attacks in Israel and the Palestinian 
Territories, accounting for 8 fatalities. 
We collected the available information about the 184 attacks and sorted it according to 
date, country, nature of target, perpetrator, casualties, and other attributes. In doing so, 
we relied primarily on media accounts from generally reliable sources. We did not use any 
classified information. 
Counting events in Israel and the Palestinian Territories poses a special challenge to analysis. 
In the ten-year period between 2009 and 2018, the Israeli Foreign Ministry recorded 322 
people in Israel killed by terrorists—an average of 32 per year.13 Approximately ten times 
that number die in road accidents in Israel each year, although the totals show road deaths 
have recently declined. Vehicle rammings are a tiny subset of terrorist-caused fatalities. 
MTI’s database records 30 deaths resulting from car ramming attacks in Israel and the 
West Bank since 1970. We are uncertain if this is complete. 
Looking at available sources of information, no two databases agree. News media accounts 
are incomplete—many incidents are not reported in the international press. Local accounts 
are not readily available and sometimes reflect biases. Some see almost every traffic 
accident involving an Arab driver and Jewish victims as a deliberate attack. Other sources 
report car ramming attacks by Israeli settlers on Palestinians, but whether these are 
deliberate attacks or hit and run accidents is hard to ascertain, although we acknowledge 
that such attacks may occur. We intend no political statement by the inclusion or omission 
of any event.
To produce a comprehensive report on vehicle ramming attacks in Israel and the 
Palestinian Territories would require a major research effort by itself and its findings would 
be contentious. That is beyond our resources and not the purpose of this broader report. 
In some cases, we did not have accurate data on the vehicle type or weight or information 
about its speed, which would be useful. While there is still work to be done and errors are 
always possible, we are confident that we have a reasonably accurate representation of 
the selected events.
LONG-TERM TRENDS: ATTACKS AND LETHALITY OVER THE YEARS
Figure 3 shows the volume of attacks and their lethality calculated from 1981 through the 
end of the third quarter of 2019, illustrating the sharp increase in the volume of attacks 
after 2013. The number of attacks in the updated data set increased from 78 to 184, and 
the total fatalities increased from 281 to 481, yielding a decrease in the overall fatalities 
per attack (FPA) from 3.6 to 2.6. The figure also compares the trajectory in the May 2018 
MTI report (grey line) with the 2019 (brown line) data.
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Figure 3. Vehicle Rammings Over Time: 1981 through 9/2019
Lethality is shown for the same period in Figure 4, showing that the addition of new attacks 
in the 1980s skews the lethality trend line downward for the new data somewhat. This 
trend is attributable to the very lethal attacks by mentally disturbed persons particularly 
in China in the 1980s and the addition of more attacks with less lethality in recent years.
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Figure 4. Vehicle Ramming Lethality Over Time: 1981 through 9/2019
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GEOGRAPHY: GENERAL COUNTRY GROUPS
Table 1 reproduces the previous (May 2018) data on attacks and lethality divided into the 
three general geographical categories: Israel and the Palestinian Territories (West Bank 
and Gaza), Developed Countries, and Developing Countries.1
Table 1. All Attacks by General Geographic Categories
All
Israel & Occupied 
Territories
Developed 
Countries
Developing 
Countries
5-Year Period # A # F FPA # A # F FPA # A # F FPA # A # F FPA
1973–1978 1 8 8.0 NONE 1 8 8.0 NONE
1979–1982 NONE NONE NONE NONE
1983–1987 1 0 0.0 NONE NONE 1 0 0
1988–1992 1 2 2.0 1 2 2.0 NONE NONE
1993–1997 4 21 5.3 1 3 3.0 1 0 0.0 2 18 9.0
1998–2002 3 8 2.7 2 8 4.0 1 0 0.0 NONE
2003–2007 6 3 0.5 NONE 6 3 0.5 NONE
2008–2012 9 18 2.0 5 5 1.0 3 6 2.0 1 7 7.0
2013–4/2018 53 221 4.2 19 13 0.7 32 163 5.1 2 45 22.5
Total and Averages: 
1973 through 4/2018 78 281 3.6 28 31 1.1 44 180 4.1 6 70 11.7
Table 2 shows the revised picture, with the five-year periods slightly changed. 
Table 2. All Attacks by General Geographic Categories: Updated
All
Israel & Occupied 
Territories
Developed 
Countries
Developing 
Countries
5-Year Period # A # F FPA # A # F FPA # A # F FPA # A # F FPA
1963–1968 1 3 3.0 0 0 0.0 1 3 0.0 0 0 0.0
1969–1973 1 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 1 0 0.0 0 0 0.0
1974–1978 2 8 4.0 0 0 0.0 2 8 0.0 0 0 0.0
1979–1983 4 31 7.8 0 0 0.0 1 5 5.0 3 26 8.7
1984–1988 2 1 0.5 0 0 0.0 1 1 1.0 1 0 0.0
1989–1993 1 2 2.0 1 2 2.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0
1994–1998 5 21 4.2 1 3 3.0 2 0 0.0 2 18 9.0
1999–2003 9 22 2.4 2 8 4.0 4 8 2.0 3 6 2.0
2004–2008 19 21 1.1 2 4 2.0 15 10 0.7 2 7 3.5
2009–2013 15 52 3.5 3 1 0.3 5 8 1.6 7 43 6.1
2014 through 9/2019 125 320 2.6 32 12 0.4 68 173 2.5 25 135 5.4
Total and Averages: 
1963 through 9/2019 184 481 2.6 41 30 0.7 100 216 2.2 43 235 5.5
1  For purposes of this report, developed countries are currently OECD signatories, and developing countries are not 
currently OECD signatories; we have created a special category for Israel (an OECD signatory country) and the 
West Bank (part of a non-signatory country) because of the large number of attacks and the unique nature of the 
Palestinian campaign there. 
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Comparing the two charts, some things jump out. As we added attacks that have occurred 
since the last report and found additional attacks from previous years, overall lethality 
decreased from 3.6 to 2.6 FPA. In Israel and the Palestinian territories, FPA decreased 
slightly from 1.1 to 0.7. In the Developed Countries, it decreased from 4.1 to 2.2. In the 
Developing Countries, it decreased dramatically from 11.7 to 5.5. Most of the decreased 
lethality comes from finding more attacks with few fatalities, mostly by mentally unstable 
individuals. Initial searches based on media sources invariably capture the more serious 
incidents—those involving more casualties. More intense searching turns up low-level 
incidents, which attract less media attention and therefore are harder to identify. 
The attacks remain at a low until the 1999–2003 time period and then steadily increase, 
with a spike between 2004–2008. They then increase dramatically in the last 5.75-year-
period, 2014 through September 2019. The higher number of attacks is particularly 
noticeable in the Developed Countries (13 times more than the previous period), and in 
Israel and the West Bank (11 times more), and it is less so in the Developing Countries 
(3.5 times more). Lethality per attack increases somewhat for Israel and the West Bank 
but decreases somewhat for both Developed and Developing Countries.
INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES BY FREQUENCY OF ATTACK
Table 3 shows the old and new picture of countries ranked by number of attacks. (The 
older table has been adjusted from the previous report by combining Israel and the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip into one “country” for the sake of analysis: Israel and the West Bank, 
since there were no vehicle rammings in the Gaza Strip.)
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Table 3. All Attacks by Country by Frequency: Original and Updated
Country # Attacks # Fatalities FPA
Israel & West Bank 41 30 0.7
United States 39 25 0.6
China 28 187 6.7
France 14 89 6.4
United Kingdom 10 13 1.3
Germany 7 17 2.4
Japan 6 10 1.7
Australia 5 7 1.4
Russian Federation 3 1 0.3
Sweden 3 7 2.3
Austria 2 3 1.5
Canada 2 10 5.0
Country # Attacks # Fatalities FPA Haiti 2 18 9.0
Israel & West Bank 28 31 1.1 India 2 11 5.5
United States 13 12 0.9 Ireland 2 1 0.5
France 10 88 8.8 Netherlands 2 7 3.5
United Kingdom 5 12 2.4 Spain 2 15 7.5
China 3 52 17.3 Belgium 1 0 0.0
Haiti 2 18 9.0 Brazil 1 1 1.0
Spain 2 15 7.5 Czechoslovakia 1 8 8.0
Germany 2 14 7.0 Finland 1 1 1.0
Canada 2 10 5.0 Italy 1 0 0.0
Sweden 2 7 3.5 Mexico 1 2 2.0
Austria 2 3 1.5 Nigeria 1 8 8.0
Czechoslovakia 1 8 8.0 Poland 1 0 0.0
Netherlands 1 6 6.0 Romania 1 0 0.0
Australia 1 5 5.0 Sri Lanka 1 0 0.0
Belgium 1 0 0.0 Taiwan 1 3 3.0
Ireland 1 0 0.0 Tajikistan 1 4 4.0
Japan 1 0 0.0 Uganda 1 3 3.0
Sri Lanka 1 0 0.0 United Arab Emirates 1 0 0.0
Total/Averages 78 281 3.6 Total/Averages 184 481 2.6
Clearly, we have found attacks in more countries, now 31 instead of 18.
The 2018 MTI report showed that most attacks took place in Israel and the West Bank (with 
28 incidents), then the United States (with 13 incidents), followed by France (with 10), the 
UK (5), and then China (3). 
In the expanded database, Israel and the West Bank still lead with 41 attacks, while the United 
States is second (with 39), then China (with 28), France (with 14), the United Kingdom (with 
10), and then Germany (with 7). The basic order hasn’t changed much, except for China, 
with 25 more incidents, again mostly because of the increased capture of additional attacks 
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by mentally disturbed individuals.
INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES RANKED BY LETHALITY
Table 4 compares the findings of the previous analysis and the new picture of countries 
ranked according to lethality.
Table 4. All Attacks by Country by Lethality: Original and Updated
Country # Attacks # Fatalities FPA
Haiti 2 18 9.0
Czechoslovakia 1 8 8.0
Nigeria 1 8 8.0
Spain 2 15 7.5
China 28 187 6.7
France 14 89 6.4
India 2 11 5.5
Canada 2 10 5.0
Tajikistan 1 4 4.0
Netherlands 2 7 3.5
Taiwan 1 3 3.0
Country # Attacks # Fatalities FPA Uganda 1 3 3.0
China 3 52 17.3 Germany 7 17 2.4
Haiti 2 18 9.0 Sweden 3 7 2.3
France 10 88 8.8 Mexico 1 2 2.0
Czechoslovakia 1 8 8.0 Japan 6 10 1.7
Spain 2 15 7.5 Austria 2 3 1.5
Germany 2 14 7.0 Australia 5 7 1.4
Netherlands 1 6 6.0 United Kingdom 10 13 1.3
Canada 2 10 5.0 Brazil 1 1 1.0
Australia 1 5 5.0 Finland 1 1 1.0
Sweden 2 7 3.5 Israel & West Bank 41 30 0.7
United Kingdom 5 12 2.4 United States 39 25 0.6
Israel 14 26 1.9 Ireland 2 1 0.5
Austria 2 3 1.5 Russian Federation 3 1 0.3
United States 13 12 0.9 Belgium 1 0 0.0
West Bank and Gaza Strip 14 5 0.4 Italy 1 0 0.0
Belgium 1 0 0.0 Poland 1 0 0.0
Ireland 1 0 0.0 Romania 1 0 0.0
Japan 1 0 0.0 Sri Lanka 1 0 0.0
Sri Lanka 1 0 0.0 United Arab Emirates 1 0 0.0
Total/Averages 78 281 3.6 Total/Averages 184 481 2.6
Previously, lethality was highest in China, then Haiti, France, Czechoslovakia, Spain, 
Germany, Netherlands, Canada, and Australia, with a worldwide FPA of 3.6. Now, the 
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highest ranking countries are Haiti, Czechoslovakia, Nigeria, Spain, China, and France, 
followed by India, Canada, Tajikistan, the Netherlands, Taiwan and Uganda, with a 
worldwide FPA of 2.6. 
With total numbers so small, a single violent incident can distort the results. In the previous 
analysis, for countries with more than 10 attacks, the only country above the overall 
average was China. Now, those countries are China and France.
ANALYSIS BY ATTACKER CATEGORIES 
The next set of tables compare the current and previous analyses of four main attacker 
categories in terms of volume of attacks, fatalities, and lethality. These are categories of 
attackers, not specific groups. They include those inspired by jihadist ideologies, regardless 
of whether they claim to act on behalf of al Qaeda or ISIS or indicate no apparent preference; 
Palestinians; right-wing extremists; an assemblage of anti-immigrant, anti-abortion, and 
other extremist causes; and mentally disturbed or unstable individuals. 
The use of terms like “mentally disturbed” or “mentally unstable” takes us into a sensitive 
area, which merits further discussion. The terms “mentally disturbed” and “mentally 
unstable” are used here in a generic sense, realizing that, to mental health professionals, 
they could mean any one of many hundreds of specific mental disorders. And we recognize 
that temporary but extreme emotional distress or a psychotic episode can propel a person 
into a homicidal rage, which appears to be the case in some of the incidents. 
We are not mental health professionals and have made no independent assessment of 
any one’s mental state at the time of the incident; nor could we have access to medical 
reports. Instead, we have relied on what sources reported at the time and what was said, 
sometimes by the defendants themselves, during subsequent trials. 
Many people would consider deliberately driving over pedestrians as bizarre behavior, but 
some of the drivers also expressed bizarre motives. One woman claimed that she wanted 
revenge for “the hatred shown to her by her family and the world.” Another wanted revenge 
because “famous singers had stolen his songs.” One claimed that the devil ordered him to 
drive over people while another said he heard the “voice of the heavens.” 
In some cases, psychiatrists testified that the defendants had a history of delusions or 
suffered from paranoid schizophrenia. Courts heard arguments that an individual was 
incompetent to stand trial for reasons of insanity and sometimes, they agreed, but not 
always--mental competence means something entirely different in the legal context. 
A number of those convicted of terrorist vehicle ramming attacks also had histories of 
diagnosed mental illness.
Without offering a specific diagnosis, we believe that the terms “mentally disturbed” or 
“mentally unstable” can be reasonably applied to these cases, without confirming a specific 
diagnosis or intending offense. Above all, we do not wish to imply that persons affected by 
mental health problems should be considered dangerous. Our very strong view is that they 
need help and intervention. We are talking about a small number of extreme cases—an 
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average of less than two a year—occurring worldwide over a half century. 
Table 5 shows the previous breakdown of attacks, fatalities and FPA for these four main 
attacker categories: Jihadists, Mentally Disturbed, Palestinian, and Right-Wing Groups 
or Extremists. 
Table 5. All Attacks by Main Attacker Groups in 5-Year Periods
Jihadist Palestinian Mentally Disturbed
Right-Wing Groups or 
Extremists
5-Year Period # A # F FPA # A # F FPA # A # F FPA # A # F FPA
1973–1978 NONE NONE 1 8 8 NONE
1978–1982 NONE NONE NONE NONE
1983–1987 NONE NONE NONE NONE
1988–1992 NONE 1 2 2.0 NONE NONE
1993–1997 NONE 1 3 3.0 1 0 0 2 18 9.0
1998–2002 NONE 2 8 4.0 NONE 1 0 0.0
2003–2007 1 0 0.0  NONE 3 3 1 1 0 0.0
2008–2012 NONE 4 5 1.3 2 0 0.0 NONE
2013 through 4/2018 12 138 11.5 19 13 0.7 12 23 1.9 4 1 0.3
Total/Averages 13 138 10.6 27 31 1.1 19 34 1.8 8 19 2.4
Table 6 shows the more recent analysis of the same groups, which together now account 
for 160 (87 percent) of the 184 attacks.
Table 6. All Attacks by Main Attacker Groups in 5-Year Periods: Updated
Jihadist Palestinian Mentally Disturbed
Right-Wing Groups or 
Extremists
5-Year Period # A # F FPA # A # F FPA # A # F FPA # A # F FPA
1963–1968 NONE NONE 1 3 3.0 NONE
1969–1973 NONE NONE 1 0 0.0 NONE
1974–1978 NONE NONE 2 8 4.0 NONE
1979–1983 NONE NONE 4 31 7.8 NONE
1984–1988 NONE NONE 1 1 1.0 NONE
1989–1993 NONE 1 2 2.0 0 0 0.0 NONE
1994–1998 NONE 1 3 3.0 2 0 0.0 2 18 9.0
1999–2003 NONE 2 8 4.0 5 11 2.2 1 0 0.0
2004–2008 1 0 0 1 4 4.0 14 17 1.2 1 0 0.0
2009–2013 NONE 3 1 0.3 8 36 4.5 NONE
2014 through 9/ 2019 18 144 8.0 32 12 0.4 53 102 1.9 6 1 0.3
Total/Averages 19 144 7.6 40 30 0.8 91 209 2.3 10 19 1.9
Several things jump out here:
Jihadists: The total number of Jihadist attacks increases from 13 to 19. The additional 
cases have all occurred in the most recent period. The lethality of Jihadist attacks, 
however, went down from 10.6 FPA to 7.6 FPA—the additional attacks diluted the 
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effect of the attack in Nice, France. Still, except for the Uighur attacks in China, 
Jihadist attacks have the highest lethality.
Palestinians: We added 13 attacks, including those that were missed in the earlier 
analysis. Their overall lethality remains low, dropping from an FPA of 1.1 to 0.8.
Mentally Disturbed: Many more attacks were added, bringing the total to 91 instead of 
the 19 included in the first cut. Some of these caused significant casualties, but many 
appear more spontaneous and were not particularly well planned. The overall lethality 
for this category did go up somewhat from an FPA of 1.8 to 2.3. They remain consider-
ably less lethal than jihadists.
Right-Wing Groups: Two more attacks were added to the current period of time, with 
lethality dropping from and FPA of 2.4 to 1.9
Table 7 charts the specific attacker groups, ranked by number of attacks, highlighting 
those whose FPA is the overall average, according to the first analysis.
Table 7. All Attacks By Specific Attacker Groups by Frequency
Attacker Groups # Attacks # Fatalities FPA
Palestinian without a specific Islamic group affiliation 22 20 0.9
Mentally-Disturbed Individual, Confirmed or Highly Likely 17 33 1.9
Jihadist, Confirmed or Highly Likely 8 133 16.6
Right-Wing Extremist Individuals or Groups 8 19 2.4
Unknown Motive 6 7 1.2
Jihadist, Possible 5 5 1.0
Palestinian Group, Non-Jihadist 5 11 2.2
Uighur Separatists 3 52 17.3
Mentally Disturbed Individual, Possible 2 1 0.5
Irish Protestant Groups 1 0 0.0
Tamil Groups 1 0 0.0
Total/Averages 78 281 3.6
The new depiction appears in Table 8.
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
29
By the Numbers
Table 8. All Attacks By Specific Attacker Groups by Frequency: Updated
Attacker Groups # Attacks # Fatalities FPA
Mentally Disturbed Individual, Confirmed or Highly Likely 71 175 2.5
Palestinian without a specific Islamic group affiliation 35 19 0.5
Mentally Disturbed Individual, Possible 20 34 1.7
Unknown Motive 17 27 1.6
Jihadist, Confirmed or Highly Likely 12 138 11.5
Right-Wing Extremist Individuals or Groups 11 20 1.8
Jihadist, Possible 6 5 0.8
Palestinian Group, Non-Jihadist 5 11 2.2
Uighur Separatists 3 52 17.3
Unknown Group 2 0 0.0
Irish Protestant Groups 1 0 0.0
Tamil Groups 1 0 0.0
Total/Averages 184 481 2.6
In terms of frequency, there are more attacks by Palestinian and mentally disturbed or 
unstable assailants, who now account for a majority of the attacks. 
In terms of lethality, though, the only two specific sets that are above the overall average 
in both data sets are attacks confirmed or highly likely carried out by Uighurs and jihadists.
Tables 9 and 10 compare the use of suicide attacks by the attacker category. In the most 
recent analysis (Table 10), which has been expanded to include all categories, jihadists 
have the highest percentage of suicide attacks, except for Uighur groups—all three of 
the Uighur attacks were suicide operations. Mentally disturbed attackers account for the 
highest total number of suicide attacks, but these comprise only 16 percent of the total. 
Table 9. Percentage of Suicide Attacks by Attacker Category
Attacker Type Suicide Attacks All Attacks % of All Attacks
Jihadist 6 13 46%
Mentally Disturbed 5 19 26%
Palestinian 6 27 22%
Right Wing 1 8 13%
Table 10. Percentage of Suicide Attacks by Attacker Category: Updated
Attacker Type Suicide Attacks All Attacks % of All Attacks
Uighur Groups 3 3 100%
Jihadist 7 19 37%
Palestinian 7 40 18%
Mentally Disturbed 15 91 16%
Right Wing 0 10 0%
Unknown or Other 0 21 0%
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As Figure 5 shows, vehicle ramming attacks by Jihadist groups increased sharply after 
2006 when the first such attack took place. The driver in the 2006 case did not claim 
specific affiliation with al Qaeda or Jihadist ideology, but said he carried out the attack “to 
avenge the deaths of Muslims around the world.” We have labeled it a Jihadist attack. 
Attacks by mentally disturbed individuals increased even more rapidly than Jihadist 
attacks.
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Figure 5. Jihadist versus Mentally Disturbed Vehicle Rammings Over Time: 2006 
through Sept 2019
As Figure 6 shows, the lethality of JIhadist attacks also increased sharply, especially 
in 2016, the year of the attack in Nice. The lethality of attacks by mentally disturbed 
persons shows a less dramatic increase. (Uighur separatists in China are the most lethal 
attackers, but they account for only three incidents.)
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Figure 6. Jihadist versus Mentally Disturbed Vehicle Ramming Lethality Over 
Time: 2006 through September 2019
TARGET CATEGORIES
The next section of the report examines target categories. What kinds of venues are most 
frequently selected by the attackers and where do they achieve their highest lethality? 
Tables 11 and 12 compare the previous and the more recent analysis in terms of frequency. 
Table 11. All Attacks by Target Group by Frequency
Target Group # Attacks # Fatalities FPA
Bus Stations or Stops 18 22 1.2
Public Streets: Vehicle Access 15 25 1.7
Public Streets: Pedestrianized 10 34 3.4
Public Gathering: Demonstration, Other 5 110 22.0
Medical Facility 4 0 0.0
Religious Institution (or Guards protecting them) 4 0 0.0
Public Gathering: Market (religious or open) 3 55 18.3
Public Streets: Pedestrianized & Vehicle Access 3 17 5.7
Train Stations and Stops 3 10 3.3
Buses 3 5 1.7
Military or Police Forces protecting a public street 3 2 0.7
Area outside Public Building 3 1 0.3
Entertainment 2 0 0.0
Public Road Infrastructure 1 0 0.0
Public Stores 1 0 0.0
Total/Averages 78 281 3.6
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Table 12. All Attacks by Target Group by Frequency: Updated
Target Group # Attacks # Fatalities FPA
Public Streets: Vehicle Access 60 120 2.0
Bus Stations or Stops 25 39 1.6
Public Streets: Pedestrianized 15 43 2.9
Public Gathering: Demonstration, Other 14 117 8.4
Public Gathering: Religious Event or Open Market 13 90 6.9
Entertainment 11 28 2.5
Religious Institution (or Guards protecting them) 9 1 0.1
Educational Institution 7 12 1.7
Other Public Building 6 0 0.0
Military or Police Forces protecting a public street 5 0 0.0
Area outside Other Public Building 4 1 0.3
Medical Facility 4 0 0.0
Public Streets: Pedestrianized & Vehicle Access 3 13 4.3
Train Stations and Stops 3 13 4.3
Airport Public Area 2 0 0.0
Buses 2 4 2.0
Public Road Infrastructure 1 0 0.0
Total/Averages 184 481 2.6
Bus stops were identified as the most frequent venue for vehicle ramming attacks in the 
previous analysis. The expanded analysis shows the greatest number of attacks on public 
streets with vehicle access, followed by bus stations and stops. Public gatherings then follow, 
as previously, but in a slightly different order. 
A different picture emerges when the attack venues are ranked by lethality, as shown in 
Tables 13 (reflecting the previous MTI report) and 14 (reflecting the current expanded report). 
Table 13. All Attacks by Target Group Lethality
Target Group # Attacks # Fatalities FPA
Public Gathering: Demonstration, Other 5 110 22.0
Public Gathering: Market (religious or open) 3 55 18.3
Public Streets: Pedestrianized & Vehicle Access 3 17 5.7
Public Streets: Pedestrianized 10 34 3.4
Train Stations and Stops 3 10 3.3
Public Streets: Vehicle Access 15 25 1.7
Buses 3 5 1.7
Bus Stations or Stops 18 22 1.2
Military or Police Forces protecting a public street 3 2 0.7
Area outside Public Building 3 1 0.3
Medical Facility 4 0 0.0
Religious Institution (or Guards protecting them) 4 0 0.0
Entertainment 2 0 0.0
Public Road Infrastructure 1 0 0.0
Public Stores 1 0 0.0
Total/Averages 78 281 3.6
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Table 14. All Attacks by Target Group Lethality: Updated
Target Group # Attacks # Fatalities FPA
Public Gathering: Demonstration, Other 14 117 8.4
Public Gathering: Religious Event or Open Market 13 90 6.9
Public Streets: Pedestrianized & Vehicle Access 3 13 4.3
Train Stations and Stops 3 13 4.3
Public Streets: Pedestrianized 15 43 2.9
Entertainment 11 28 2.5
Buses 2 4 2.0
Public Streets: Vehicle Access 60 120 2.0
Educational Institution 7 12 1.7
Bus Stations or Stops 25 39 1.6
Area outside Other Public Building 4 1 0.3
Religious Institution (or Guards protecting them) 9 1 0.1
Airport Public Area 2 0 0.0
Medical Facility 4 0 0.0
Military or Police Forces protecting a public street 5 0 0.0
Other Public Building 6 0 0.0
Public Road Infrastructure 1 0 0.0
Total/Averages 184 481 2.6
Although the FPA data occasionally drop considerably—as they did with some sets of 
public gatherings involving demonstrations, religious events, or open markets—the overall 
rankings change very little. The most lethal attacks still occur when vehicles plow into public 
gatherings. Train stations and stops come next, followed by pedestrianized public streets. 
Whether they are pedestrianized or not makes a difference. Attacks on pedestrianized 
streets yield an FPA of 2.9; attacks on streets with ordinary vehicle traffic yield an FPA of 
only 2.0, lower than the overall average of 2.6. 
Public plazas immediately adjacent to train stations are now also venues where attacks 
above the overall average lethality occur, but the number of such incidents is low and this 
may just be a consequence of small numbers.
TARGET SELECTION AND LETHALITY
The next section combines target frequencies and resulting casualties over time. The 
objective here is to look at trends. To simplify matters, venues are aggregated into four 
columns:
The first column, “ALL,” comprises the total number of attacks, the total number of 
fatalities, and the average FPA for attacks at all venues in five-year periods. 
The second column, “PUBLIC GATHERINGS,” comprises public gatherings of all 
types, including open air markets, celebrations, parades, as well as pedestrianized 
public streets and promenades.
The third column, “PUBLIC STREETS WITH VEHICULAR ACCESS,” combines 
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ordinary streets, including areas around public surface transportation such as bus 
stops and train stations.
The fourth column, “PUBLIC BUILDINGS,” includes those attacks where vehicles are 
deliberate rammed into municipal or commercial buildings.
The results are shown in Table 15, which is our most recent analysis. 
Table 15. All Attacks by Target Category in 5-Year Periods
All Public Gatherings
Public Streets 
with Vehicular 
Access Public Buildings
5-Year Period #A #F FPA #A #F FPA #A #F FPA #A #F FPA
1963–1968 1 3 3.0 NONE 0 1 3 3.0 NONE 0
1969–1973 1 0 0.0 NONE 0 NONE 0 1 0
1974–1978 2 8 4.0 1 0 0 1 8 8.0 NONE 0
1979–1983 4 31 7.8 1 5 5 1 0 0.0 2 26 13
1984–1988 2 1 0.5 NONE 0 1 1 1.0 1 0 0
1989–1993 1 2 2.0 NONE 0 1 2 2.0 NONE 0
1994–1998 5 21 4.2 2 18 9.0 3 3 1.0 NONE 0
1999–2003 9 22 2.4 2 5 2.5 3 13 4.3 4 4 1.0
2004–2008 19 21 1.1 5 4 0.8 7 11 1.6 6 6 1.0
2009–2013 15 52 3.5 4 9 2.3 9 43 4.8 2 0 0.0
2014–Though 9/2019 125 320 2.6 23 210 9.1 78 104 1.3 25 6 0.2
Total: 1963 through 9/2019 184 481 2.6 38 251 6.6 105 188 1.8 41 42 1.0
a  Includes markets, celebrations, pedestrianized public streets, etc.
b  Includes public surface transport, aviation, and public road infrastructure.
c  Includes areas outside public buildings.
Public streets and locations adjacent to public surface transport are the most frequent 
venues for vehicle ramming attacks, accounting for 105 of the incidents. Public buildings 
and areas outside of them come in second place with 41 incidents. Public gatherings, 
including pedestrianized streets, follow with 38 incidents.
In terms of lethality, however, vehicle ramming attacks on public gatherings (with 
pedestrianized streets included) account for the most fatalities and have the highest 
lethality by far at 6.6 FPA. Public streets with vehicular access plus public surface transport 
venues account for fewer fatalities overall and have a lower FPA of 1.8. Finally, vehicle 
ramming attacks on public buildings account for the fewest fatalities and have the lowest 
FPA at 1.0. Interestingly, lethality for public gatherings reached a high in the last five-year 
period, for public streets in the previous five-year period, and for public buildings back in 
the 1979–1983 period. 
HOW ATTACKERS TRY TO INCREASE LETHALITY
Suicide drivers proved to be significantly more lethal than non-suicidal drivers. Table 16 
shows that the overall average FPA is 2.6. For non-suicide attacks, the average FPA is 
1.8. When confirmed and possible suicide attacks are combined, the average FPA is 6.6. 
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Table 16. Suicide and Non-Suicide Attacks by Lethality
Suicide Category # Attacks # Fatalities FPA
Possible 15 129 8.6
Yes 17 81 4.8
Unknown: Attacker(s) not killed or injured 10 25 2.5
No 132 241 1.8
Unknown: Attacker(s) killed or injured 10 5 0.5
Totals/Averages 184 481 2.6
Other things drivers have done to increase fatalities include swerving the vehicle back 
and forth as opposed to a straight-line attack or continuing the attack with stabbings or 
arson devices. As Table 17 shows, there is only one attack—the 2014 attack by Uighur 
separatists in China—where suicide attackers, driving two vehicles, swerved them back 
and forth while throwing explosive or incendiary devices out of the windows as the two 
cars careened through the crowd. The attack resulted in 43 fatalities, although since it 
involved two vehicles, it might be considered two simultaneous attacks. 
Suicide attackers were able to increase the FPA from an average of 2.6 to 8.4, a net 
improvement of 5.8. Swerving the vehicle alone adds 2.0 to the average FPA. Swerving the 
vehicle combined with continuing the attack with stabbings, as in the June 2017 London 
Bridge/Borough Market attack, adds 1.4 to the average FPA. Continuing the attack with 
stabbing only reduces FPA by 0.7, while continuing the attack with arson reduces it by 2.6. 
The variations reflect very few cases. The only thing that can be said with confidence is 
that suicide attacks are deadlier and swerving the vehicle adds casualties.
Table 17. Lethality Enhancers by Increase of FPA 
Lethality Multiplier # Attacks # Fatalities FPA FPA > 2.6 Average
Suicide+Swerving+Throwing IIDs from the Vehicle (e.g., 
Uighur Attack in China) 1 43 43.0 40.4
Suicide (yes or possible) only 32 210 8.4 5.8
Vehicle Swerve only (yes or probable) 60 278 4.6 2.0
Suicide+Swerving+Attack continued with Stabbings (e.g., 
London) 3 12 4.0 1.4
Attack Continued with Stabbings only (yes and possible) 25 48 1.9 -0.7
Attack Continued with Arson only 5 0 0.0 -2.6
DOES PLANNING INCREASE LETHALITY?
The number of attackers combined with the use of other tactics than vehicle ramming 
suggests greater planning as opposed to the more impulsive attacks carried out often by 
mentally unstable individuals, especially when multiple attackers continue the attack after 
ramming, stabbing or shooting additional victims or detonating explosive or incendiary 
devices. 
The question is, are more people killed to any significant degree? Looking at the number 
of attackers and tactics, the answer, as hinted at above, continues to be no. When two 
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high-lethality events are set aside (a single attacker on the 2016 Bastille Day in Nice which 
killed 86, and a 2014 attack by multiple Uighur attackers in two vehicles in Umpqua, China 
that killed 43), lethality is not enhanced. 
Number of Attackers
As Table 18 shows, 168 or 91% of the attacks were conducted by a single perpetrator, 
and only 12 attacks were conducted by more than one attacker: five by 2 people, five by 
3 people, and two by 5 people. (There are four older attacks from prior databases that do 
not allow us to know or estimate the number of attackers.) 
Table 18. Number of Attackers by Frequency
Perpetrator Fatality Category by Attack # Attacks % of all Attacks
Single Attackers, Attacker not Killed 129 70.1%
Single Attackers, Attacker Killed 39 21.2%
Multiple Attackers, No Attackers Killed 2 1.1%
Multiple Attackers, Some or All Attackers Killed 10 5.4%
Unknown, No Fatalities 4 2.2%
Total/Percentages 184 100%
The fatalities and injuries that the attackers themselves suffered suggests determination. 
It is perhaps not surprising that in 129 or 77% of the 168 “single-attacker” cases, none of 
the attackers were killed at the scene of the attack; in 39 of these 129 attacks, the attacker 
was killed. By contrast, in the attacks involving more than one attacker, all or some of the 
attackers were killed in 10 (or 83%) of the 12 attacks. There were only two events involving 
more than one attacker in which none of the attackers were killed or injured: the 2002 
attack on a Synagogue in France by right-wing extremists and a 2004 attack against a pub 
In Northern Ireland by Protestant extremists. 
Looking at all 203 attackers from our data known to have participated in these vehicle 
ramming attacks, 63 were killed (or 31%) at the scene of the attack, while another 25 were 
injured.
Table 19. Number of Attackers and Lethality Enhancers by Frequency
Type of Attack # Attacks # Fatalities FPA
Single Attacker, No Attack Method other than Vehicle Ramming 
(includes 4 older cases where details are unknown) 136 253 1.9
Single Attacker, Attack continued after Ramming 27 38 1.4
Single Attacker, Automatic/Semi-Automatic Weapons used inside 
Vehicle (Nice’s 86 casualties excluded) 5 7 1.4
Multiple Attackers, No Attack Method other than Vehicle 
Ramming 4 10 2.5
Multiple Attackers, Other Attack means used in Vehicle or after 
Ramming 8 58 7.3
Looking further at single versus multiple attackers in Table 19 above, we see that of the 168 
single-perpetrator attacks, in 136 (81%) of the cases, the attacker neither used another 
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attack method while still in the vehicle nor continued the attack after the ramming. (We 
assume that the four older attacks for which there were little data involved single attackers 
and only a vehicle.) The average number of fatalities per attack in these cases was 1.9. 
The lethality attained in the 27 incidents (16% of the single-attacker incidents) where the 
attack was continued after the ramming—there were 38 people killed—actually decreased 
to an FPA of 1.4. The remaining 5 attacks (3%) where automatic weapons were used 
while the attacker was still inside the car—excluding the case in Nice, which is a special 
case—killed only 7 people, providing the same lethality (1.4 FPA). Excluding Nice, when 
single attackers were involved, lethality was lower than the overall average of 2.6 and 
even dropped when the attack was continued from inside the vehicle or outside after the 
ramming. 
The situation for multiple attackers is oddly similar. When we look at those 12 attacks, 
there were only 4 cases where the attackers neither used weapons or explosive devices 
while inside the car nor continued the attack after the ramming, and in only 2 were there 
fatalities. During Easter 2019, two attackers rammed a vehicle into an Easter procession 
of youths in Gombe, Nigeria, killing 8 and injuring 17 (the two attackers were killed by 
the avenging mob). Earlier, in 2013, a group of Uighurs killed two in a suicide attack in 
Tiananmen Square. The FPA for these 4 attacks is therefore 2.5, only slightly below the 
overall average of 2.6. 
In the remaining 8 attacks, where the perpetrators either fired weapons or threw explosive 
devices out of the windows, or continued the attack with various weapons after the ramming, 
a total of 58 people were killed, giving a much higher FPA of 7.3, which is 2.8 times more 
than the overall FPA of 2.6. However, a majority of the 58 fatalities resulted from a single 
incident in China where two sport utility vehicles carrying 5 attackers rammed through 
crowds at a busy street market. As the vehicles careened through the fleeing shoppers, 
the assailants threw explosive devices out of the windows. The vehicles then smashed 
into each other and exploded. In all, 43 persons were killed and more than 90 were injured. 
Distortion by a single incident is always a problem when dealing with a small number of 
incidents. If the Urumqi attack is set aside, the FPA of the remaining 7 attacks is 1.9, which 
is below the overall average.
Vehicle Acquisition
How the vehicle is acquired is another, perhaps better indicator of planning. As Table 20 
indicates, the most common means (71%) of attaining a vehicle was by owning it, either 
personally or as part of a family. Other means of attaining a vehicle include theft (9.2%), 
renting (5.4%), using a vehicle as an employee (4.3%), and hijacking (2.2%). 
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Table 20. Vehicle Acquisition Method by Frequency
Vehicle Acquisition Method # Attacks % Attacks # Fatalities FPA
Owned or Presumed Owned Personal (121) or Family (3) Vehicle 131 71.2% 219 1.7
Stolen 17 9.2% 30 1.8
Unknown or TBD 12 6.5% 30 2.5
Rented 10 5.4% 141 14.1
Operated as an employee 8 4.3% 39 4.9
Hijacked 4 2.2% 22 5.5
Borrowed 1 0.5% 0 0.0
Presumed Owned and then Rented, two vehicles used 1 0.5% 0 0.0
Totals/Averages 184 100.0% 481 2.6
But turning to lethality in Table 21, we find the lethality attained by those who used their 
own or their family car was relatively low—1.7 FPA. By contrast, the most lethal attacks 
involve rented vehicles. The have an average FPA of 14.1, although again this reflects 
the attack in Nice, France. Without the episode, attacks with rented vehicles still have 
an FPA of 5.1, which is higher than average. The next most lethal acquisition method is 
hijacking a vehicle, with an even higher FPA of 5.5. Attacks using a company vehicle—
often construction equipment—achieve an FPA of 4.9. All other acquisition methods do not 
boost overall lethality. 
While exact vehicle types are hard to find in older attacks, we do know that 8 of the 12 
rented vehicles were trucks or vans and that of the 21 vehicles stolen or hijacked, 12 were 
larger vehicles—trucks, buses, or construction equipment. 
This suggests that planned rentals, hijackings, and thefts often, but not always, aim at 
acquiring larger vehicles which can be more lethal.
Table 21. Vehicle Acquisition Method by Lethality
Vehicle Acquisition Method # Attacks % Attacks # Fatalities FPA
Rented 10 5.4% 141 14.1
Hijacked 4 2.2% 22 5.5
Operated as an employee 8 4.3% 39 4.9
Unknown or TBD 12 6.5% 30 2.5
Stolen 17 9.2% 30 1.8
Owned or Presumed Owned Personal (121) or Family (3) 
Vehicle 131 71.2% 219 1.7
Borrowed 1 0.5% 0 0.0
Presumed Owned and then Rented, two vehicles used 1 0.5% 0 0.0
Totals/Averages 184 100.0% 481 2.6
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Given the dramatic increase in the number of vehicle ramming attacks since 2014, we 
decided to isolate this most recent period from the longer-term analysis. These five-and-
three-quarter years account for 125 attacks or 68% of the total. 
Table 22 shows the total attacks, fatalities, and FPA for this period. It shows an increasing 
number of incidents to a high plateau in 2017 and 2018, then falling sharply in the first nine 
months of 2019. Lethality increases dramatically in 2016, but this increase results from the 
Nice attack in which 86 people were killed. Setting aside that attack gives 1.5 as the FPA 
for 2016. 
Table 22.  2014 through 9/2019: Attacks by Year
Year Attacks % of 14–19 Attacks Fatalities FPA
2014 11 8.8% 62 5.6
2015 19 15.2% 13 0.7
2016 11 8.8% 102 9.3
2017 36 28.8% 63 1.8
2018 35 28.0% 61 1.7
2019 13 10.4% 19 1.5
Total/Averages 125 100.0% 320 2.6
Table 23 shows the same data disaggregated into three main attacker types. Mentally 
disturbed attackers continue to predominate, accounting for 42% of the attacks and 32% of 
the fatalities. Palestinian attackers account for 26% of the attacks but 4% of the fatalities. 
Jihadist attacks are only 14% of the total but they are by far the most lethal attackers, with 
an FPA of 8.0 and accounting for 45% of the fatalities (owing in part to the 2016 Nice attack). 
Table 23. 2014 through 9/2019: Attacks by General Attacker Category by Year
All Jihadist Mentally Disturbed Palestinian
Year # A # F FPA # A # F FPA # A # F FPA # A # F FPA
2014 11 62 5.6 0 0 0.0 6 15 2.5 4 4 1.0
2015 19 13 0.7 1 0 0.0 6 10 1.7 12 3 0.3
2016 11 102 9.3 4 98 24.5 3 4 1.3 3 0 0.0
2017 36 63 1.8 10 41 4.1 10 15 1.5 7 5 0.7
2018 35 61 1.7 3 5 1.7 19 54 2.8 5 0 0.0
2019 13 19 1.5 0 0 0.0 9 4 0.4 1 0 0.0
Totals/Averages 125 320 2.6 18 144 8.0 53 102 1.9 32 12 0.4
Table 24 shows the breakdown into three main venue types. Vehicle ramming attacks on 
public gatherings, including street markets and pedestrianized streets, result in a high 
number of fatalities (66% of the total) and the highest FPA (9.1). Again, the Nice attack 
distorts the numbers. If this incident is set aside, the FPA drops to 5.3, which is still more 
than the average and considerably above the other two major target categories.
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
40
2014–2019 Analysis
Table 24. 2014 through 9/2019: Attacks by General Attacker Category by Target 
Category
All Public Gatherings
Public Streets with 
Vehicular Access Public Buildings
Year #A #F FPA #A #F FPA #A #F FPA #A #F FPA
2014 11 62 5.6 3 43 14.3 8 19 2.4 0 0 0.0
2015 19 13 0.7 0 0 0.0 18 13 0.7 1 0 0.0
2016 11 102 9.3 3 98 32.7 3 0 0.0 5 4 0.8
2017 36 63 1.8 11 42 3.8 20 19 1.0 5 2 0.4
2018 35 61 1.7 3 18 6.0 22 43 2.0 10 0 0.0
2019 13 19 1.5 3 9 3.0 7 10 1.4 3 0 0.0
Total/Averages 125 320 2.6 23 210 9.1 78 104 1.3 24 6 0.3
a  Includes markets, celebrations, pedestrianized public streets, etc.
b  Includes public surface transport, aviation, and public road infrastructure.
c  Includes areas outside public buildings.
The following two tables look at target venues in greater detail. Table 25 shows that most 
vehicle ramming attacks occur on ordinary public streets, followed by bus stops (mainly in 
Israel), then religious or open market public gatherings, then pedestrianized streets. Table 
26 gives the same information ranked by FPA instead of volume. It shows that the highest-
lethality attacks occur at public gatherings (again distorted by the Nice attack), and streets 
restricted to pedestrians or which have pedestrianized strips on them. Those are the only 
target groups where lethality is above the overall average of 2.6 FPA.
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Table 25. 2014 through 9/2019: Attacks by Target Group by Frequency
Target Group # Attacks # Fatalities FPA
Public Streets: Vehicle Access 43 66 1.5
Bus Stations or Stops 21 26 1.2
Public Gathering: Religious Event or Open Market 13 90 6.9
Public Streets: Pedestrianized 8 30 3.8
Religious Institution (or Guards protecting them) 8 1 0.1
Public Gathering: Demonstration, Other 6 89 14.8
Area outside Other Public Building 4 1 0.3
Entertainment 4 0 0.0
Military or Police Forces protecting a public street 4 0 0.0
Other Public Building 4 0 0.0
Public Streets: Pedestrianized & Vehicle Access 3 13 4.3
Airport Public Area 2 0 0.0
Educational Institution 2 4 2.0
Medical Facility 2 0 0.0
Train Stations and Stops 1 0 0.0
Total/Averages 125 320 2.6
Table 26. 2014 through 9/2019: Attacks by Target Group by Lethality
Target Group # Attacks # Fatalities FPA
Public Gathering: Demonstration, Other 6 89 14.8
Public Gathering: Religious Event or Open Market 13 90 6.9
Public Streets: Pedestrianized & Vehicle Access 3 13 4.3
Public Streets: Pedestrianized 8 30 3.8
Educational Institution 2 4 2.0
Public Streets: Vehicle Access 43 66 1.5
Bus Stations or Stops 21 26 1.2
Area outside Other Public Building 4 1 0.3
Religious Institution (or Guards protecting them) 8 1 0.1
Airport Public Area 2 0 0.0
Entertainment 4 0 0.0
Medical Facility 2 0 0.0
Military or Police Forces protecting a public street 4 0 0.0
Other Public Building 4 0 0.0
Train Stations and Stops 1 0 0.0
Total/Averages 125 320 2.6
The next two charts—Tables 27 and 28—provide an idea of where these attacks are 
occurring. As indicated in Table 27, the majority of the vehicle ramming attacks since the 
beginning of 2014 have occurred in Developed Countries, although lethality is nearly twice 
as high in Developing Countries.
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Table 27. 2014 through 9/2019: Attacks by General Geographic Group
 All
Israel & Occupied 
Territories Developed Countries Developing Countries
Year #A #F FPA #A #F FPA #A #F FPA #A #F FPA
2014 11 62 5.6 4 4 1.0 4 6 1.5 3 52 17.3
2015 19 13 0.7 12 3 0.3 4 4 1.0 3 6 2.0
2016 11 102 9.3 3 0 0.0 7 98 14.0 1 4 4.0
2017 36 63 1.8 7 5 0.7 25 48 1.9 4 10 2.5
2018 35 61 1.7 5 0 0.0 20 15 0.8 10 46 4.6
2019 13 19 1.5 1 0 0.0 8 2 0.3 4 17 4.3
Total and Averages 125 320 2.6 32 12 0.4 68 173 2.5 25 135 5.4
As Table 28 indicates, Israel and the West Bank account for 32 or slightly more than a 
quarter of the attacks. This is followed by the United States, China, and France. European 
countries account for 38 of the attacks.
Table 28. 2014 through 9/2019: Attacks by Country Ranked by Frequency
Country # Attacks # Fatalities FPA
Israel & West Bank 32 12 0.4
United States 24 19 0.8
China 16 119 7.4
France 12 88 7.3
United Kingdom 9 13 1.4
Germany 5 16 3.2
Australia 4 2 0.5
Russian Federation 3 1 0.3
Austria 2 3 1.5
Canada 2 10 5.0
Spain 2 15 7.5
Sweden 2 5 2.5
Belgium 1 0 0.0
Brazil 1 1 1.0
Finland 1 1 1.0
India 1 2 2.0
Italy 1 0 0.0
Japan 1 0 0.0
Netherlands 1 1 1.0
Nigeria 1 8 8.0
Poland 1 0 0.0
Romania 1 0 0.0
Tajikistan 1 4 4.0
United Arab Emirates 1 0 0.0
TOTAL/AVERAGES 125 320 2.6
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Table 29 ranks the same information according to lethality. Except for a recent single attack 
in Nigeria, the two attacks in Spain have the highest FPA (7.5), followed by China (7.4), 
France (7.3), Canada (5.0), Tajikistan (4.0), and Germany (3.2). All other countries have 
an FPA lower than the overall average. It’s important to note, however, that these rankings 
often reflect a single to very few attacks and therefore do not warrant high confidence.
Table 29. 2014 through 9/2019: Attacks by Country Ranked by Lethality
Country # Attacks # Fatalities FPA
Nigeria 1 8 8.0
Spain 2 15 7.5
China 16 119 7.4
France 12 88 7.3
Canada 2 10 5.0
Tajikistan 1 4 4.0
Germany 5 16 3.2
Sweden 2 5 2.5
India 1 2 2.0
Austria 2 3 1.5
United Kingdom 9 13 1.4
Brazil 1 1 1.0
Finland 1 1 1.0
Netherlands 1 1 1.0
United States 24 19 0.8
Australia 4 2 0.5
Israel & West Bank 32 12 0.4
Russian Federation 3 1 0.3
Belgium 1 0 0.0
Italy 1 0 0.0
Japan 1 0 0.0
Poland 1 0 0.0
Romania 1 0 0.0
United Arab Emirates 1 0 0.0
Total/Averages 125 320 2.6
The final two figures—Figures 7 and 8—compare the Jihadist versus the mentally 
disturbed attackers for the most recent period. It is interesting to note here that, as shown 
in Figure 7, the frequency of Jihadist attacks rises in 2017 and 2018 and then falls, while 
the frequency of attacks by mentally disturbed individuals continues to rise through 
2018, although it is decreasing somewhat thus far in 2019.
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Figure 7. 2014 through 9/2019: Jihadist versus Mentally Disturbed Attacks
Figure 8 compares recent Jihadist and mentally disturbed attackers in terms of 
lethality. Here, we see that the lethality of Jihadist rose sharply in 2016, largely owing 
to the Nice attack, then falls and climbs back up. But the overall trend for this period, 
because of the 2016 attacks, is slightly down. The lethality of attacks by mentally 
disturbed individuals remains flat.
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Figure 8. 2014 through 9/2019: Jihadist versus Mentally Disturbed Lethality
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Modern cities allow motor vehicles and pedestrians to move in close proximity—at 
intersections, they are often only inches apart. New York City has nearly 2 million 
registered vehicles14—and this figure does not count the thousands of private and 
commercial vehicles that come into the city daily. More than 8 million people live in the 
city. Commuters nearly double the population of Manhattan alone from 1.6 million to 3.1 
million.15 Los Angeles County has a population of more than 10 million people and 6.5 
million registered vehicles.16 Without massive re-engineering and construction, the two 
cannot be separated. Vehicles are a source of continuing danger—in the United States, 
vehicles kill approximately 6,000 pedestrians annually.17 Part of the explanation is that 
drivers and pedestrians are distracted by their phones.
This suggests that complete or substantial prevention of vehicle rammings is simply 
unrealistic. But mitigation is possible. Strategies to reduce casualties caused by deliberate 
vehicle ramming attacks include preventing attackers from renting larger vehicles capable 
of causing greater casualties and protecting pedestrians with various kinds of barriers.
RENTED VEHICLES USED IN DEADLIEST ATTACKS
Our data shows that just 6 attacks since 2014 (or 5%) involved rental vehicles. However, 
these attacks accounted for 125, or 39%, of the total fatalities. These attacks also had a 
much higher number of fatalities per incident—20.8 deaths per attack. Even excluding 
the 2016 attack in Nice, France, which killed 86 persons, attacks involving rental vehicles 
account for 39 of the deaths (or 12%)—more than any other category other than using a 
personal or family car, and the deadliest category by acquisition method with an FPA of 
6.5, lower only than the 7.0 FPA attained by a single vehicle hijacking. Six (33%) of the 
18 Jihadist attacks that have occurred since 2014 involved rentals (4) and theft (2), far 
more than any other attacker group.
The United Kingdom’s Department for Transport (DfT) has issued new guidance aimed at 
preventing terrorists from getting access to larger vehicles. Rental companies are asked to 
thoroughly examine credentials, insist on electronic payment (which allows quick checks 
on identity and other information), and promptly report suspicious renters. 
Another recommended practice is to have a designated security person in every office 
who can examine applications that arouse suspicions and decide whether to allow the 
rental or notify authorities. 
Theoretically, algorithms could be developed to help rental companies identify out-of-
the-ordinary rentals, much like the algorithms airlines use to identify passengers meriting 
greater scrutiny. This could prompt cross-checking with existing databases. Such checks 
could focus not only on the attributes of the renter, but also on the size of the vehicle. 
(The Nice and Berlin attacks both involved trucks.) However, such measures raise civil 
liberty concerns, and they will not prevent terrorists from borrowing or stealing vehicles 
nor using their own.
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Lawsuits by victims of vehicle ramming attacks or members of their families may oblige 
American rental companies to adopt more rigorous security measures.
Stolen or hijacked vehicles were used in 13 of the 125 vehicle ramming attacks since 2014. 
The British government has also issued guidance to trucking companies and truckers to 
increase the security of their vehicles against theft. The British guidelines call for thorough 
pre-employment checks, improving security in truck yards, CCTV, controlling access by 
contractors and visitors, actions by drivers to prevent vehicle theft, keeping route and 
scheduling information confidential, reporting suspicious behavior, and promptly reporting 
thefts. The prompt reporting of a truck stolen in Virginia in 2019 enabled police to prevent 
what could have been a devastating vehicle ramming attack.
In addition to the sensible steps outlined by British authorities, some commercial trucking 
fleets have remote tracking devices that enable monitoring of route deviations; remote 
shutdown capabilities to immobilize stolen vehicles or trucks deviating from prescribed 
routes could also be utilized. MTI research on the possibility of terrorists using vehicles 
carrying hazardous materials as weapons has explored this approach.18
PROTECTING PEDESTRIANS
The other broad approach is to enhance barriers between pedestrians and vehicles. The 
objective here is to reduce the highest-lethality attacks. The deadliest vehicle-ramming 
incidents occur where vehicles—particularly but not exclusively vans or trucks—mow 
down pedestrians at public gatherings such as open-air markets or on pedestrianized 
streets from which vehicles are prohibited but nevertheless can enter. Open air markets 
and celebrations attract crowds, and foot traffic on pedestrianized streets is usually dense. 
This makes these venues lucrative targets for vehicular assaults, rather like a super-sized 
bowling ball that doesn’t lose momentum, knocking over many dozens of human bowling 
pins caught in a narrow alley. 
Some urban planners are already pedestrianizing town centers and shopping districts 
for environmental and commercial reasons. In response to the Irish Republican Army’s 
bombing campaign, British authorities created the so-called “Ring of Steel” around 
London’s financial district. The concern here was not preventing vehicle ramming attacks, 
which were not part of the IRA’s tactical repertoire, but rather preventing the terrorist group 
from getting large truck bombs into the area. Protective measures involved manned check-
points where trucks were inspected before entry, restricted truck routes in and through 
the protected area, and the pedestrianization of a number of streets. In addition to the 
increased security, the reduction of vehicle traffic and enhanced environment for walking 
and sidewalk cafes were seen to improve the quality of life in the protected zone.
Many European cities have streets that are pedestrianized permanently or on certain 
days. These become promenades for shoppers and tourists. The lesson learned from 
the August 17, 2017 Las Ramblas attack in Barcelona, however, is that they can also 
become attractive targets for attackers if vehicles can easily gain access. Pedestrianized 
streets must be adequately protected by barriers. If vehicles are to be allowed in at 
times, temporary or pop-up bollards can be installed to ensure safety, and providing 
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barriers—even strong lamp poles and large tree pots—for pedestrians to “dodge” behind 
can be useful. 
Temporary assemblies of people at, for example, open air markets or street celebrations, 
can also be protected by parking vehicles to block access to streets and plazas where 
street markets or other events are being held or by deploying a new and growing range 
of temporary anti-vehicle barriers. To protect more than 2 million people gathering to 
celebrate the arrival of 2019 in New York City’s Times Square, city authorities added 
200 concrete blocks to the existing metal bollards that protect the square and parked 60 
heavy sanitation trucks and almost 200 police cars to block intersections leading to the 
pedestrianized area.19 
Security measures were in place to protect those watching the fireworks on Bastille Day 
in July 2016 in Nice, but a security failure allowed an unchecked cargo truck to enter the 
protected area—and 86 people died in the attack. Crowd-protection measures must be 
strictly observed if they are to be effective.
Groups of people waiting at bus stops are another potential target that can be protected 
by barriers. Israel has installed barriers at many bus stops.
Protecting ordinary streets on a permanent basis is a bigger challenge, although 
casualties resulting from vehicle ramming attacks in this venue are far fewer. Parked cars, 
lamp posts, and trees provide natural barriers against cars jumping the curb to attack 
pedestrians. Additional barriers can be installed to cover gaps. These need not be ugly 
concrete fortifications, but instead can be attractive planters, even statuary. Access from 
parked cars to the sidewalk has to be maintained. The fences between sidewalks and 
streets that now prevent jaywalking or street crossings at dangerous intersections could 
be strengthened and expanded. 
The threat of terrorist truck bombs has already resulted in road closures and the installation 
of barriers around government buildings. These measures could be expanded, widening 
the security circle. A more ambitious measure to protect against vehicular attacks would 
entail surrounding entire portions of cities with surveillance systems and physical barriers. 
More armed police could be deployed to increase surveillance and enable faster response 
to an attack. However, the time for a moving car or truck to suddenly veer into pedestrians 
is a matter of seconds—a vehicle traveling 30 miles an hour can travel 660 feet, a standard 
city block, in 15 seconds. Rapid response is good, but it cannot prevent carnage. There 
has been some discussion of allowing police to fire into a ramming vehicle – Washington 
DC, New York and Chicago and revised their guidelines -- a tactic previously not permitted 
because of the risk to innocent life.
With the promise of autonomous vehicles, software can be developed to prevent them 
from ramming into pedestrians. Autonomous vehicles (AVs), however, will create other 
vulnerabilities.
These are ideas discussed, and not a catalog of practical or proven countermeasures. More 
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analysis is required to determine whether these potential countermeasures to vehicular 
terrorism would be effective, to identify other countermeasures, and to examine their costs 
and potential consequences. This work does not preclude a discussion of whether the 
potential results merit the disruption and investment such measures would entail.
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